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SPEECH
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
David B. Sentelle*
In April of 1993, the Supreme Court issued the decision in Shaw v.
Reno. That decision holds:
only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assem-
bly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters
into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification.
Some erudite academic observers found the decision both surprising
and disturbing, though I was not certain why, then or now. In fact, I
made a few stops on the Federalists' tour, speaking, and in one instance
debating Professor Samuel Issacharoff at the University of Texas, on the
proposition that Shaw v. Reno was totally unremarkable and unsurpris-
ing, although in another sense one of the most profound decisions of the
Court in nearly forty years. I want to rehash that briefly before going on
to discuss what little, and I think it is little, although the same erudite
observers may think it much, Miller v. Johnson, decided in 1995, adds to
the Shaw pronouncement.
In the 1860s, this nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, specifying that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Thereafter, in a
wide range of cases, conspicuously Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
the Court held that "[a] racial classification, regardless of purported moti-
vation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an ex-
traordinary justification."
Otherwise put, "the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation
that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Judge Sentelle delivered these remarks in a speech to the Federalist Society of the Colum-
bus School of Law at The Catholic University of America on November 1, 1995.
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This principle applies not only to legislation that contains explicit racial
distinctions, but also to statutes that may be race neutral but are on their
face "unexplainable on grounds other than race." As early as 1960, the
Supreme Court readily applied that principle to a state's redefinition of
its interior political boundaries, for example, "from a square to an un-
couth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner designed to exclude voters
from the voting unit on the basis of their race.
That is the legal landscape against which Shaw was decided. The fac-
tual background is that in 1992, the legislature of North Carolina redrew
its congressional districts to reflect the increase in the state's house dele-
gation from eleven to twelve. The pattern of the districts, with but two
arguable exceptions, was far more geometrically uncouth than the bound-
aries of Tuskegee reviewed in Gomillion. State Senator Dennis Winner,
Chairman of the state senate redistricting committee, loudly proclaimed
that the districts were drawn on racial bases. He blamed the Department
of Justice for forcing the legislature to do so. So the legislative record was
clear that the uncouth districts were drawn for the purpose of racial
gerrymandering.
Against that background of fact and law, Professor Robinson Everett,
on behalf of himself, Ms. Ruth Shaw, and three other North Carolina
voters, sued to enjoin the use of those districts. A three-judge court, split
two-to-one with my successor on the district bench issuing the dissent,
upheld the legislature's redistricting plan. Given the Supreme Court law
as I recited it earlier, and the facts as the Chairman admitted them to be,
it should be wholly unsurprising that the Supreme Court reversed that
part of the three-judge opinion.
So much for the view that the opinion is unremarkable. Now what of
my apparently contradictory description of the case as profound? That
has to do with the ironic fact that a great many people found the decision
surprising and remarkable and with a profound simplicity with which Jus-
tice O'Connor addresses the controversy for the Court's majority. With
few preachments, and little fanfare, she spoke to a subject which I think
goes deeply to the roots of what sort of civilization we are.
I suggest, and I do so with neither embarrassment nor hesitation, that
the development of western civilization is the greatest historical saga in
the history of humankind. The triumph of western civilization as a his-
toric and worldwide phenomenon is unparalleled. As Dr. Richard
Weaver suggested, it is the "paradigm of essences toward which mankind
is more or less constantly coalescing." But its history is, of course, not
without flaw. The greatest flaws in the last two centuries of western civili-
zation have occurred when the state (and I speak now not of the thirteen
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or fifty United States in one American union, but of the state in the gen-
eral sense) differentiated among its citizens on the basis of the racial
groups to which they belong. Chattel slavery in its last century, the Jim
Crow laws in the south, the Holocaust of Nazi Germany, and the brutal
apartheid regime of South Africa all occurred when the state determined
to treat its citizens differently because of their perceived racial makeup.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Shaw v. Reno, more
than perhaps any opinion for the Court since Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, recognized and struck against the root of those historic flaws. As
she said, "[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district individu-
als who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated
by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in com-
mon with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid." I commend Justice O'Connor for the
moderation of her language. In fact, such a plan does not "bear[ ] an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid," it is nothing else but
apartheid.
We in this country have recognized and roundly condemned the South
African practice of erecting boundaries based on the race of those who
live within them. The Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot recog-
nized and roundly condemned that act of the Alabama legislature in wall-
ing out voters because of their race. Justice O'Connor for the majority in
Shaw v. Reno does the same thing.
The only new element, and it escaped me why it was remarkable, is that
in Shaw it was white voters who complained rather than black. But I
suggest that it is profoundly wrong to assume that black citizens would
universally or automatically oppose the position taken by the plaintiffs
and by the majority of the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno. To so assume
is the very stereotypical thinking that led to the erection of the districts in
the first place. The Supreme Court in other contexts has long deemed
impermissible state action based on perceptions of racial stereotype. For
example, in Holland v. Illinois, following Batson v. Kentucky, the Court
described it as "undoubtedly true" that a "prosecutor's 'assumption that a
black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black...
is impermissible' " and that "such an assumption violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause." So while recognizing the profound importance of the
Court's rejection of these assumptions in Shaw v. Reno, I nonetheless
come out where I came in. The decision should be unremarkable.
A racial classification for political districting is state action discriminat-
ing among citizens on the basis of their race. State action discriminating
among citizens on the basis of race is subject to strict scrutiny. The Court
1996] 1251
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will not permit such discriminatory state action to stand unless it is nar-
rowly tailored to meet sufficiently compelling state interests. That princi-
ple applies even where the words of the statute are race neutral but are
"unexplainable on grounds other than race." Factually, the North Caro-
lina districts are unexplainable on any basis other than race, or at least
the plaintiffs colorably so alleged. It should be totally unsurprising that
the dismissal was reversed.
In upholding the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court maintained
that the legislature totally abandoned traditional principles of redistrict-
ing, such as compactness, contiguity, and the preservation of the bounda-
ries of political subdivisions. As to compactness, District 12, the later
drawn of the two majority-minority districts, stretches over 160 miles in a
meandering, snakelike form, with occasional branches, from Gastonia,
North Carolina in the Western Piedmont where it encompasses only a
few predominantly black neighborhoods. It then runs east in a narrow
line the approximate width of Interstate 85 with that highway to Char-
lotte, where it encompasses only majority black neighborhoods; then
north, again running with Interstate 85, drifting only occasionally to pick
up black voters; through Winston-Salem, where it widens out to encom-
pass predominantly black neighborhoods; closing back down again to the
width of 1-85, drifting off the main road occasionally to pick up a few
more majority black neighborhoods until it runs up into Greensboro,
where it spreads out again to pick up the majority black core of that city;
back down to the width of the highway until it enters Durham County,
where it picks up the predominantly black neighborhoods in Durham.
Following the meanders of the district, the legislature abandoned the
principle of contiguity as thoroughly as it did the principle of compact-
ness. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the district itself is contigu-
ous only at a geometric point, but it is worse than that. The black and
white map attached to the Supreme Court's opinion masks what the full
color map of North Carolina I brought with me discloses.1 That is, while
District 12 itself is theoretically contiguous, it cuts the majority white Dis-
trict 6, the Greensboro district, into three noncontiguous segments. Also,
if we examine independently Districts 1 and 3 (District 1 is the other ma-
jority black district) on a full color map, you can see that either one of
those districts is not contiguous or both of them preserve contiguity only
by a theoretical geometric point, as those two districts at more than one
1. Compare Shaw v. Reno, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511, 536A (1993) infra as Appendix A
(reproducing a map of the North Carolina Congressional Plan) with Appendix B (repro-
ducing a map of North Carolina provided by the News & Observer of Raleigh, North
Carolina).
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place appear to meet at X lines. In short, the legislature abandoned the
contiguity principle along with compactness.
Finally, as to political subdivisions, in drawing the race-based districts,
North Carolina's legislature not only ignored county lines and city limits,
but by going directly to census tracts, it actually ignored precincts. Thus,
even within a single polling place, voters from black neighborhoods and
white neighborhoods or black and white portions of the same neighbor-
hoods are segregated into separate congressional districts. Commission
Chairman Winner, in his ironic lament of being "forced" into these dis-
tricts by the Department of Justice, accused that Department of having
"required... that we go back to 'separate but equal."' Since most of you
are too young to remember the significance of that particular phraseol-
ogy, that was the defense by southern segregationists of the old pre-
Brown v. Board of Education school districts. They were separate, but
they were equal. The Brown Court held that being separate, they were
inherently unequal. So has the present Court rightly held as to congres-
sional districts in Shaw v. Reno.
Those who were (or purported to be) surprised or offended by the
Shaw v. Reno decision took Justice O'Connor's recitation of the evidence
as being the complete statement of the law. That is to say, they accused
the Court of having held the district unconstitutional because it was bi-
zarre in its shape. When I debated Professor Issacharoff and when I
spoke to the Federalists at other places, I took the position that Justice
O'Connor's opinion held not that the districts were unconstitutional be-
cause they were ugly, but that the redistricting plan was unconstitutional
because it was racially based. The ugliness of the districts was merely
evidence of the proposition that the legislative action was "unexplainable
on grounds other than race."
In the Miller case, the Supreme Court for the first time had a chance to
apply Shaw and tell us whether or not I was correct in that assessment.
While I am not always correct in predicting what the Supreme Court will
do, I was that time, perhaps because it was rather easy. In the Miller
case, the three-judge panel reviewing a Georgia redistricting plan with
the same racial motivation as North Carolina's, that is, to create majority-
black districts, struck down that plan as unconstitutional. Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the majority in Miller, affirmed that decision. All the
Miller decision adds to Shaw is the clarification, which I have thought
unneeded, that the thrust of Shaw is to recognize a justiciable claim dis-
tinct from vote dilution for citizens of those states where redistricting is
the result of racial classification. Justice Kennedy quoted from Shaw:
12531996]
Catholic University Law Review
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dan-
gers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters - a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to
aspire.
To those who did not read or understand the words from Shaw, he
added: "[olur observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial stere-
otyping was not meant to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face
before there is a constitutional violation," and
[s]hape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary ele-
ment of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of
proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence
that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles,
was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in draw-
ing its district lines.
There is not much more question to be raised. Last Term, the Supreme
Court not only gave us Miller v. Johnson, but also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, which conspicuously held that a benignly derived but invidi-
ously discriminatory program of racially based set-asides is unconstitu-
tional. If we doubted before, we know now that the Equal Protection
Clause is colorblind. We may expect that the apostles of so-called reverse
discrimination will fight effective implementation of colorblind equal pro-
tection, just as did their predecessors in the old south in the days follow-
ing Brown v. Board of Education. They are not the majority on the
Supreme Court.
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